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Robert C. Fisher 
During the summer of 1942 the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) destroyed five 
German U-boats in the space of six weeks. It 
was a remarkable feat for a small, inexperienced 
navy. Canadian warships had sunk only two 
enemy submarines during the first three years 
of the war, and had not sunk one in ten months. 
The surprising success of the summer of 1942 
was not sustained: after the fifth sinking the RCN 
did not sink another U-boat for four months. 
Thus, the summer U-boat kills were an unusual 
phenomenon which has been remarked upon by 
Canadian naval historians. Historians have not, 
however, offered an explanation for the summer 
successes or studied them in detail. This is 
generallybecause the actions took place as part 
of larger convoy battles which have captured the 
attention of historians and dissuaded study of 
the U-boat sinkings in relation to one another.] 
There is, however, good reason for studying 
the kills in isolation from the larger convoy 
battles around them because, as Marc Milner 
has demonstrated, the thrust of RCN training 
had been the destruction of U-boats and not the 
defence of convoys. The United States Navy also 
emphasized offensive anti-submarine warfare in 
contrast to the Royal Navy (RN), to which the 
"safe and timely arrival of the convoy" was 
paramount. Commander J.D. Prentice, RCN, was 
the architect of this approach in the Canadian 
Navy and had led the drive for operational 
training at Halifax and St. John's since the spring 
of 1941. Prentice drilled escorts in "the basics 
of co-operat ion and teamwork" b u t the 
"emphasis was on effective anti-submarine 
warfare" rather than the protection of convoys. 
Though many of Prentice's initiatives were short-
lived due to a scarcity of resources and 
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operational necessities, his most ambitious effort 
to train escorts began in April 1942 and 15 or 
16 escorts passed through this training program 
shortly before the Germans resumed wolf pack 
operations against transatlantic convoys in July 
1942.2 Studying the sinkings separately from the 
convoy battles allows comparisons to be made 
and conclusions to be drawn about the 
proficiency of the RCN at its chosen task. 
Reviewed individually, each kill was made 
under a unique combination of circumstances 
revealing the state of the art of anti-submarine 
warfare among the elite escorts of the RCN. 
Collectively, the sinkings shed light on a period 
of transition between the traditional submarine 
warfare of 1941 and the advanced technological 
warfare of 1943. They demonstrate that, at this 
stage of the Battle of the Atlantic, capable 
leadership could still overcome deficiencies of 
equ ipment and weaponry t h r o u g h the 
application of training, tactics, and experience. 
The Sinking of U-90 
The RCN sank its third enemy submarine on 24 July 1942 during the wolf pack attack 
on convoy ON 113. The German attack signalled 
the return of the U-boats to the North Atlantic 
convoy routes after a prolonged absence. It was 
the first battle of a campaign that would last until 
the decisive defeat of the wolf packs in May 1943. 
The convoy, westbound from Great Britain to 
North America, was screened by the mid-ocean 
escort group C2, whose Senior Officer was 
Commander Thomas Taylor, RN, captain of the 
British town-class destroyer Burnham. The "C" 
designation in C2 meant that the group was 
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HMCS St. Croix (ex-USS McCookj, a Canadian town-class destroyer, was acquired by the Royal Canadian 
Navy in the "Bases for Destroyers" Deal. St. Croix's Captain, Lieutenant-Commander A.H. Dobson, had a 
reputation for making quick, accurate depth charge attacks on German U-Boats. 
The quarry was U-90, a medium type VIIC 
U-boat, the mainstay of the U-boat fleet. 
Kapitänleutnant H a n s - J ü r g e n Oldörp 
commanded the submarine which was making 
its first war cruise. HMS Burnham pursued the 
other U-boat at high speed but the distant enemy 
escaped easily. Sufficient daylight was left for St. 
Croix to overtake the closer sub. Dobson refused 
to open fire with the destroyer's guns in an effort 
to keep U-90 on the surface until the range had 
fallen. He wanted to get as close as possible 
before the enemy dived in order to improve the 
odds of the eventual asdic search. Oldörp obliged 
at first by trying to outrun the destroyer but then 
finally crash dived when the gap had closed to 
6,000 yards. St. Croix's Canadian-made SW2C 
radar had obtained "no pip whatever" from the 
U-boat at this range even in the calmest ofseas; 
good evidence of the basic ineffectiveness of 
metric radar except at very short range.5 
For sound gear the destroyer was equipped 
with type 141 asdic, a modification of the 
American sonar found on most of the town-class 
destroyers. Asdic conditions were good. Dobson 
proceeded to the diving position and after 
searching along the U-boat's last known course 
for 1,500 yards was rewarded with an asdic echo 
at an extreme range of 2,400 yards. St. Croix 
classified it as a submarine contact at 1856Z 
and ran in to attack. The contact was lost at 
700 yards, revealing that U-90 had gone very 
mostly Canadian. It also included St. Croix, a 
Canadian town-class destroyer, and three RCN 
corvettes, HMC Ships Brandon, Dauphin, and 
Drumheller. The British corvette Polyanthus 
rounded out the group. Lieutenant-Commander 
A.H. Dobson, RCNR, captain of St. Croix, scored 
the first Allied success of the new campaign. 
Dobson was a reserve officer from the merchant 
marine who had been in command of St Croix 
since January 1942. He was the first reservist 
commanding officer to score a kill for the RCN.3 
German U-Boat Command had deployed the 
nine submarines of Group Wolf in a patrol line 
on the main convoy routes at the outer limits of 
Allied air cover from Great Britain and Iceland. 
The pack sighted ON 113 on 23 July and by the 
afternoon of 24 July six U-boats had made 
contact with the convoy, assisted by the dark 
smoke issuing from the merchant ships and 
maximum visibility.4 Allied shore-based High 
Frequency/Direction Finding (HF/DF) gave 
warning of the wolf pack's presence. Stationed 
ahead of the convoy, St. Croix's masthead lookout 
sighted two U-boats on the surface at 1735Z: 
one was 5 miles distant on the port bow while 
the second was farther away on the starboard 
bow. Dobson informed Taylor of the sightings 
while increasing speed to 28 knots to chase the 
closest submarine. 
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deep. The depth-charge crew changed to a deep 
setting during the run-in and fired a pattern of 
six depth charges that produced no visible 
results. Dobson circled back and re-established 
contact . This time the echo, showing no 
movement, was lost at 500 yards and six depth 
charges set to 150 and 350 feet were dropped. 
After the explosions "small pieces of splintered 
wood, bubbles of air and" oil rose to the surface 
in the destroyer's wake. Dobson opened up the 
range to 2,200 yards, regained contact and 
closed to attack. During the approach run the 
target showed no movement and "was held until 
close in" until it was finally lost at 100 yards. St. 
Croix fired a pattern of six depth charges set 
shallow to 100 feet at 1922Z. The third and final 
depth charge attack brought scattered debris and 
"numerous pieces of human flesh" up to the 
surface, marking the destruction of U-90. The 
destroyer collected the grim evidence of the kill 
as proof for the Admiralty's sceptical U-boat 
Assessment Committee.6 
It appears that the first two depth charge 
attacks were accurate and severely damaged the 
U-boat. The damage sustained by U-90 must 
have prevented it from holding its depth. The 
sub rose towards the surface where it was a 
sitting duck for the final shallow-setting attack. 
St. Croix's success was equal parts luck and skill. 
Dobson's plan to keep the U-boat surfaced while 
the range closed worked to perfection and he 
correct ly guessed the probable course 
underwater. Optimum asdic conditions enabled 
the destroyer to pick up the target at the extreme 
range of 2,400 yards. The accuracy of all three 
attacks showed the skill of the A/S team led by 
Lieutenant L.N. Earl, RCNVR, the A/S Control 
Officer, and Petty Officer M.E. Biggs, RCN, the 
Higher Submarine Detector (HSD). The depth 
charge crew's ability to adjust the depth settings 
smoothly dur ing the approach r u n s 
demonstrated that it had also attained a high 
level of efficiency. All in all, the successful attack 
reflected highly on the ability of Dobson and his 
crew. Later, in September 1942, Dobson and St. 
Croix displayed similar skill in the art of 
detecting and attacking submerged U-boats, 
severely damaging two U-boats operating against 
ON 127 (forcing them to return to port) and 
causing moderate damage in a third attack. What 
was remarkable was that in the case of all three 
attacks, the initial pattern of depth charges 
inflicted most of the damage. This was, in effect, 
Dobson's trademark; quick, accurate strikes.7 
The Sinking of U-588 
After waiting ten months for its third kill, the RCN had to wait just seven days to score its 
next kill, which also came while escorting a fast 
westbound convoy. The mid-ocean escort of ON 
115, escort group C3, was all Canadian, 
including two destroyers , Saguenay and 
Skeena, and four corvet tes , Sackville, 
Wetaskiwin, Galt, and Louisburg. Commander 
D.C. Wallace, RCNR, captain of Saguenay, was 
in command of the group. During the night of 
30/31 July, three submarines of Group Pirat 
shadowed ON 115 and were trying to home the 
rest of the pack on to the convoy. C3 had 
intercepted medium frequency homing signals 
from a U-boat and as a result Wallace deployed 
Skeena seven miles out on the starboard beam. 
The destroyer's obsolescent British type 286M 
metric radar was unlikely to detect the shadower 
but the warship's presence could still make 
shadowing difficult.8 
No attacks developed during the night but 
in the first light of dawn Skeena's lookouts 
glimpsed a U-boat on the surface six miles 
distant. The destroyer had discovered either 
U-511 or U-588, surprising both submarines in 
the morning twilight. Lieutenant-Commander 
K.L. Dyer, RCN, gave chase bu t his prey 
submerged after five minutes. Kapitänleutnant 
Friedrich Steinhoff, captain of U-511, reported 
that he was chased by a destroyer at 0628Z and 
that another sub "had also submerged," only 700 
metres away. The two U-boats crash dived about 
the same time so it is not clear which one had 
been sighted. Until now, historians have been 
unaware of the p resence of the second 
submarine, believing that U-588 was the sole 
target of the attacks. Skeena's sweep had also 
"forced off the contact-keeper, U-210, which 
sped away on the surface.9 
Dyer had a clear idea of what to do. He had 
developed his own diamond-shaped search plan 
for a single escort hunting a submerged foe, and 
now he put the scheme into practice. It involved 
dropping single depth charges at the farthest 
"positions the enemy could reach in the hopes 
of containing him in the area" so that a deliberate 
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search could then be made. Asdic conditions 
were fair and the sea was smooth. However the 
destroyer's type 124 asdic was not working well 
at ranges beyond 1,000 yards. Skeena arrived 
at the position where the U-boat had dived and 
had dropped single charges at two corners of 
the diamond-shaped search zone when at 0705Z 
a definite submarine contact was obtained at 900 
yards. Dyer counter-attacked with a pattern of 
ten depth charges set to 100 and 235 feet. Diesel 
oil could be smelled as the destroyer circled back 
and regained contact. The echo was lost at 300 
yards and the following depth charge attack was 
"slightly early." Skeena re-established contact 
at 0732Z but the target had now gone "very deep" 
and the third depth charge pattern, set to 350 
and 550 feet, failed to produce results. Dyer then 
10 
HMCS Skeena (above), a river-class destroyer, was 
ably commanded by Lieutenant-Commander K.L. 
Dyer (left), here shown in the rank of captain. 
lost contact, although a non-sub echo may in 
fact have been the real thing.10 
The target, U-511, had gone very deep after 
the initial attack. Steinhoff mistakenly blamed 
radar for "the sudden appearance of the 
destroyer" but refrained from releasing asdic 
decoys "because of the other U-boat." Unselfishly, 
he did not want to risk putting the destroyer on 
to U-588 or to keep the hunter above in the 
vicinity any longer than necessary. Skeena's 
depth charge barrage was "well-aimed, but higher 
than the boat" according to Steinhoff. It had not 
caused any damage to U-511 which, however, 
took "on a great deal of water" as a result of the 
great depth it had reached. Steinhoff used "every 
means available to pump ship during the depth 
charging series, without considering the 
possibility of being heard." Whatever the noise, 
the destroyer did not regain contact.11 
Commander D.C. Wallace had in the 
meantime ordered HMCS Wetaskiwin to join the 
destroyer in the hunt ; both escorts were 
commanded by professional RCN officers and 
Milner has observed that it was probably for this 
reason tha t Wallace chose the corvette. 
Lieutenant-Commander G.S. Windeyer, RCN, 
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The victors over U-588 are received by senior RCN commanders. Left to right: Rear Admiral L.W. Murray, 
Commanding Officer (CO), Atlantic Coast; Lieutenant Commander O.S. Windeyer, CO of HMCS Wetaskiwin; 
Vice Admiral P.W. Neues, Chief of the Naval Staff; and Lieutenant Commander K.L Dyer, CO of HMCS 
Skeena. 
Wetaskiwin made asdic contact with U-588, but 
the echo was not marking on the paper of the 
range recorder. Lieutenant R.K. Lester, RCNVR, 
the A/S Control Officer, obtained the "trace by 
opening the recorder box & marking it with 
pencil," a trick learned at the Mobile Anti-
Submarine Training Unit. The contact was lost 
before an attack could be carried out. Windeyer 
regained contact 15 minutes later and fired a 
pattern of ten depth charges without result. 
Skeena joined and in the interim Leading 
Seaman A.E. McConney, RCNVR, the corvette's 
HSD, ran below to make some adjustments "in 
order to get a better trace." Wetaskiwin re-
established contact and directed the destroyer 
on to the target, which Dyer attacked at 0912Z 
with a pattern of ten depth charges set to 350 
and 550 feet. Next it was the corvette's turn, but 
after its attack at 0931Z the echo was lost and 
the two warships separated to cover more water 
in their search.14 
Windeyer admitted that "a partial breakdown 
in the smooth co-ordination of his A/S team 
contributed to "considerable uncertainty" over 
the position of the U-boat. He was retracing his 
steps when a lookout sighted oil "coming up in 
blobs" to the surface. The last pattern of depth 
11 
had co-operated with Dyer during a counter-
attack southwest of Rockall three weeks earlier 
and since then they had discussed the best 
means of handling a deep U-boat. Thus, they 
were thoroughly acquainted with each other and 
with the tactics to be adopted, a familiarity which 
would prove lethal to the enemy. Wetaskiwin had 
the obsolescent pre-war type 123A asdic but had 
received valuable training with Prentice's group 
in late May, including exercises with a tame 
submarine in Conception Bay. It had also had 
the benefit of training on the Mobile Anti-
submarine Unit in St. John's and would put this 
practice to good use in the hunt. The corvette 
arrived about 0800Z and Windeyer, although 
senior, ordered Dyer to direct the search because 
of his better equipped ship and knowledge of 
the U-boat's last known position. However, it was 
U-588, lurking nearby, and not U-511 that 
became the target of the next attack.12 
U-588 was a type VIIC U-boat, commanded 
by Kapitänleutnant Viktor Vogel. Vogel was 
experienced and successful, having torpedoed 
seven merchant ships of 33,000 tons during his 
three previous war cruises. But he had yet to 
score on this, his fourth and final patrol.13 At 
0830Z, forty minutes after Skeena's last echo, 
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charges had apparent ly damaged U-588. 
Wetaskiwin recovered the contact at 1010Z at 
1,800 yards, and ran in to attack with a pattern 
set to 500 feet. No further evidence of damage 
was found but oil continued to appear on the 
surface and the contact was regained. Windeyer 
felt that the "plot now suggested that there was 
not enough throw-off in our attacks" and decided 
to experiment by making the attacks by plot 
"after losing contact on the run in." The two 
following attacks did not produce more definite 
resul ts but Skeena rejoined to assist the 
corvette.15 
Wetaskiwin directed the destroyer into 
position at 1117Z for the final attack. During 
the approach run Dyer changed the depth setting 
from 350 to 550 feet, and reduced the size of 
the pattern to five depth charges because he had 
only 19 left. Just as the corvette's flag dipped, 
Skeena, its own plot also having showed that it 
had reached the firing point, dropped an 
elongated pattern of five depth charges. Windeyer 
considered the attack to be "dead on" and 
maintained the echo, which "now showed no 
movement," for three minutes afterwards until 
"two distinct underwater explosions, thirty 
seconds apart" heralded the destruction of 
U-588. Oil, floating debris, and human remains 
soon rose to the surface and were collected as 
proof of the kill. Steinhoff, nearby in U-511, had 
counted 104 depth charges over six hours but 
his boat escaped with only slight damage and 
flooding caused by the "great depths" to which it 
had been forced.16 
The successful captains learned from their 
experience. Windeyer stressed that the victory 
was achieved "due to a happy co-operation 
between two ships which have been accustomed 
to working together." In par t icu la r , he 
emphasized that the captain, A/S Control Officer, 
and HSD, "must pay more attention to" the 
doppler which gave "a plain indication of the 
target's evasive turns." Dyer, in addition to 
describing his diamond search scheme, argued 
that searching for a submerged U-boat was 
"largely a matter of luck unless" the escort had 
type 271 radar to provide an accurate range and 
bearing of where the enemy had dived. Dyer 
complained that "with the present condition of 
A/S equipment, very little idea of the submarine's 
movements can be estimated with the deep diving 
tactics" employed by U-boats. Sub-Lieutenant 
12 
E.M. Chadwick, RCN, the A/S Control Officer, 
elaborated on the destroyer's asdic problems, 
claiming that in all of the "attacks contact was 
not gained at anything much over 1,000 yards, 
and there was never a trace of any use." Finally, 
Dyer echoed Windeyer on the importance of close 
coordination, "it was only due to the happy 
combination of two ships in the group who had 
exercised together, tha t the a t tacks were 
successful."17 
The success against U-588 was the result of 
teamwork and training. The high standard of 
training of the two A/S teams was readily 
apparent by their ability to overcome technical 
shortcomings. Skeena's asdic was not picking 
up the echo at ranges greater than 1,000 yards; 
a severe handicap considering the depth of the 
U-boat ensured the echo was lost at 600-700 
yards, leaving a very small window of opportunity 
for the HSD, Petty Officer A.A. Butchart, RCN. 
Wetaskiwin's plot was not tracing clearly but the 
A/S team's training helped it to improvise a 
solution. The use of the corvette's asdic to hold 
contact while guiding the destroyer in for the 
depth charge attack made the kill possible. The 
large amount of time they could devote to the 
search, allowed by Wallace because it was early 
in the day and they had several hours to rejoin 
before nightfall, was also an important factor. In 
this, their freedom from the constraints of convoy 
defence foreshadowed the deployment of hunter-
killer groups.18 
The Sinking of U-210 
The third RCN U-boat kill within two weeks occurred on 6 August with SC 94, a slow 
convoy bound for Britain. The mid-ocean escort, 
CI, included three British corvettes, three 
Canadian corvettes, and the Canadian destroyer 
Assiniboine. Group Steinbrink, a wolf pack of 
11 U-boats, had intercepted SC 94 on 5 August 
and torpedoed one merchant ship. During the 
following day enemy submarines shadowed the 
convoy but the escort held them at bay. HMCS 
Assiniboine and HMS Dianthus attacked and 
damaged U-595 in the morning, forcing it to drop 
out of the battle to make repairs.19 
Returning from this attack, lookouts aboard 
the destroyer sighted the conning tower of a 
U-boat at 1712Z, six miles distant. It was U-454, 
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not U-210, as is often stated. Patches of fog 
caused visibility to vary between 200 yards and 
eight miles. Assiniboine gave chase at 22 knots 
but after ten minutes the U-boat crash dived 
under cover of the fog. Guessing correctly that 
U-454 had submerged, Lieutenant Commander 
J o h n H. S t u b b s , RCN, h u n t e d with the 
destroyer's asdic but failed to make contact. 
U-454 escaped below the surface, reporting only 
that a warship had passed overhead without 
attacking.20 
The escorts had again shaped course to 
rejoin the convoy when Assiniboine's type 286P 
radar obtained a contact at 1836Z, and a few 
minutes later lookouts sighted U-210. Stubbs 
opened fire but the U-boat increased speed and 
eluded the warship in the fog. U-210 was a type 
VIIC boat making its first war patrol. The 
captain, Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Lemcke, "an 
experienced destroyer officer, " had recently been 
transferred to U-boats to take command of 
U-210. His training in surface warships may 
explain his reluctance to submerge. Stubbs 
obtained another radar contact at 1850Z at a 
range of 1,200 yards. Assiniboine closed at full 
speed and after one minute sighted U-210 on 
the surface.21 Dr. Gilbert Tucker, the Naval 
Historian, witnessed the action and later recalled 
that the U-boat "suddenly appeared out of the 
mist...some fifty yards away and about to cross 
our bow."22 
Stubbs prepared to ram but Lemcke took 
evading action while manoeuvring within the 
destroyer's turning circle. Stubbs went "full 
astern on the inside engine" to prevent U-210 
from gaining an attacking position. In tandem 
with the tight manoeuvring, the guns erupted at 
close range in a fierce duel. Assiniboine's 4.7-
inch guns could not depress to fire but its 0.5-
inch mach ine-guns swept U-210's deck, 
preventing its 88-mm gun from being manned. 
The U-boat responded with its 20-mm flak gun 
and riddled the bridge with hits. Shells hit 
gasoline tanks on deck which ignited a fire that 
raged across Assiniboine's forecastle and 
bridge.23 Chief Petty Officer Max L. Bernays, 
RCNR, ordered the crew out of the threatened 
wheelhouse while Lieutenant R.L. Hennessy's 
damage control party fought the blaze. With 
flames engulfing his only exit, Bernays remained 
inside and performed the jobs of three men, 
calmly executing over 100 helm orders required 
for the frantic pursuit.24 
During the 30 minute duel that ensued 
Stubbs was close enough to watch Lemcke "on 
the conning tower bending down" to pass wheel 
orders. Three or four times Assiniboine came 
close to ramming the submarine but narrowly 
missed the slippery target. The flames and 
smoke billowing from the destroyer convinced 
Lemcke that he had inflicted serious damage. 
Remaining on the surface, he was confident that 
U-210 could escape in the fog. Shells from the 
U-boat's 20-mm cannon disabled Assiniboine's 
most forward 4.7-inch gun, killing one and 
wounding three of the gun crew. Finally however, 
the destroyer's 0.5-inch machine-guns silenced 
the flak gun. The after 4.7-inch gun then scored 
a direct hit on the conning tower, killing Lemcke 
and all of the bridge crew.25 
The issue was no longer in doubt. Leutnant 
Heinz Sorber, the Engineer Officer, made one 
final attempt to submerge and escape below the 
surface. While U-210 held a steady course to 
dive, Assiniboine rammed it just "abaft the 
conning tower." The U-boat descended to 18 
metres but the electric motors failed and the 
screws were damaged. Water flooded into U-210 
through the diesel air-intake and its ruptured 
stern. Sorber "gave the order to blow tanks and 
abandon ship." After the submarine surfaced, 
Stubbs rammed again "well abaft the conning 
tower and fired a shallow pattern of depth 
charges." Another 4.7-inch shell hit the U-boat's 
bow. The crew scuttled U-210 and abandoned 
ship before it sank.26 Assiniboine and HMS 
Dianthus rescued 38 survivors.27 
The destroyer's success was not achieved 
without cost: 13 wounded and one killed. In 
addition, Assiniboine sustained considerable 
damage, including flooding below the water line. 
Stubbs had to detach and return to St. John's 
because of the scars.28 The destruction of U-210 
in a surface action fought in patches of fog spoke 
highly of the professionalism of Stubbs and the 
level of training attained by his crew. According 
to Petty Officer CG. Vander Hagen, RCN, Stubbs 
was "cool under fire" and "never flinched." Tucker 
praised his concentration, judgment, and 
disregard for personal safety.29 The Chief of the 
Naval Staff and the Naval Minister formally 
recommended Chief Petty Officer Bernays for the 
13 7
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Opposite: 
Top left, top right and bottom, right: Dramatic 
photos taken during the running battle between 
HMCS Asslniboine and U-210 on 6 August 1942. 
(Photos by G.E. Salter, NAC PA 37443, 37444, & 144289) 
Bottom left: Rear Admiral L.W. Murray aboard 
HMCS Assiniboine following the sinking of U-210. 
Left to right: Unknown; Captain R.E.S. Bidwell, Chief 
of Staff to Murray: Unknown; Lieutenant 
Commander J.H. Stubbs, CO of Assiniboine; Murray, 
St. John's NFLD, 10 August 1942. 
(NAC PA 131802) 
Victoria Cross. However, British authorities felt 
that it did not warrant this highest of awards 
and he had to settle for the rare Conspicuous 
Gallantry Medal.30 Modern sensors and weapons 
played a marginal role in this classic duel which 
pi t ted t rad i t iona l naval skil ls such as 
seamanship and gunnery in close quarters 
combat. The primitive nature of the radar and 
asdic types carried by RCN escorts ensured that 
eyesight was still the primary sensor. The era of 
dependence on visual contact was coming to a 
close, however, and U-210 was the first RCN 
U-boat kill in which radar had made the initial 
detection. 
The Sinking of U-94 
The sinking of U-94 by HMCS Oakville and a US Navy Catalina aircraft was the only one 
of the RCN's summer successes not to take place 
on the North Atlantic convoy routes. Earlier in 
the spring, Naval Service Headquarters had 
assigned six corvettes to escort Canadian oil 
tankers to and from the Caribbean Sea. The 
escort of the Trinidad-Key West convoy TAW 15 
consisted of three RCN corvettes, Oakville, 
Halifax, and Snowberry, a Dutch minelayer, and 
five American warships, the destroyer Lea and 
four small patrol craft and submarine chasers. 
Commander J.F. Walsh, USN, the captain of USS 
Lea, commanded this mixed escort. TAW 15 had 
an uneventful voyage until 27 August when it 
approached the Windward Passage, a focal point 
where two U-boats lay in wait.31 
Despite heavy air patrols, U-94 escaped 
detection and sighted the convoy's mastheads 
in the afternoon. The enemy sub shadowed from 
a distance and waited for nightfall to close to 
attack. U-94 was a veteran type VIIB U-boat, on 
its t en th war c ru ise , commanded by 
Oberleutnant Otto Ites who, although only 24 
years of age, was an experienced and successful 
U-boat ace. Since taking command of U-94, he 
had torpedoed 14 ships of almost 80,000 tons, 
mostly from North Atlantic convoys and had 
received the Knight's Cross in April.32 
Darkness fell but the night was moonlit and 
bright. Walsh had positioned the escorts about 
5,000 yards from the convoy. Visibility was four 
miles up moon and two miles down moon, with 
a moderate sea running. HMC Ships Snowberry 
and Oakville screened the port bow and quarter, 
with a sub chaser stationed in between them. 
U-94 crept toward the convoy's port side on the 
surface, unseen by the escorts. Snowberry's type 
286M radar had broken down while Oakville's 
SW2C radar revealed no trace of the intruder.33 
Ites was preparing to fire at a ship when a lookout 
sighted an aircraft, and instead ordered a crash 
dive. It was a Catalina flying boat from US Navy 
Patrol Squadron 92 based at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba. Pilot Lieutenant Gordon R. Fiss, USN, had 
sighted U-94 in the moonlight at 0258Z and 
dropped four 650-pound depth bombs on its 
swirl. The explosions shook the U-boat when it 
was between 10 and 20 metres beneath the 
surface. Unknown to the German crew the bow 
hydroplanes had been damaged, forcing the sub 
back to the surface. Fiss circled back to drop a 
flare over the U-boat's position.34 
Oakville's crew heard three explosions and 
observed a column of water one mile ahead. The 
corvette altered course and increased speed to 
15 knots. Lieutenant-Commander Clarence A. 
King, RCNR, was an experienced submarine 
hunter who had served in the Royal Naval 
Reserve as captain of a Q-ship during the First 
World War. He had been credited with a possible 
U-boat kill and received the Distinguished 
Service Cross. Despite his age, 56, he assumed 
command of Oakville in May 1942 and quickly 
earned a reputation as an outstanding officer. 
His superiors described him as "an efficient and 
popular commanding officer" with "the right 
offensive spirit."35 
Oakville closed at full speed and fired a 
pattern of five depth charges, set to 100 feet, on 
the flare without having made asdic contact. King 
altered course 30° to starboard to hunt with asdic 
in good conditions. The HSD immediately 
obtained a firm asdic contact, 10° on the 
starboard bow at a range of 600 yards, moving 
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A patriotic poster in Hubert Rogers' "Men of Valor" 
series depicting the actions of Sub-Lieutenant H.E.T. 
Lawrence and Stoker Petty Officer A. Powell in 
boarding U-94. 
to the left. Less than one minute later, the U-boat 
surfaced about 100 yards ahead on the starboard 
bow, heading left. Oakville fired two white 
rockets to announce the enemy's presence while 
altering course to ram, but U-94 passed under 
its bow, narrowly grazing the corvette's port 
side.36 The submarine accelerated but could not 
exceed 12 knots. Ites "thought that the screws 
had been damaged" by the impact but other crew 
members later thought it had damaged the 
coupling between the diesels and the electric 
motors. Either way, U-94 could not make 
emergency speed to outrun the corvette on the 
surface.37 
King opened up the range between Oakville 
and the U-boat to bring the four-inch gun into 
play, and gain speed to ram again. The four-inch 
opened fire and quickly scored a hit on the 
conning tower. German gunners tried to man 
their weapons but the corvette's Oerlikon, Lewis 
gun, and 0.5-inch machine guns swept the deck 
16 
"making it impossible for the submarine to man 
any gun throughout the action." Another four-
inch shell shattered the sub's 88-mm deck gun 
and Oakville rammed again, but struck another 
glancing blow. The corvette, too close for its guns 
to bear, fired a depth charge which exploded 
directly below L7-94.38 
King prepared to ram again but Ites had 
decided, apparently after the second ramming, 
to give up the fight and gave the order to abandon 
ship.39 Oakville rammed the submarine a third 
time at 0345Z abaft the conning tower. In a fine 
display of ship-handling, King pulled close along 
side of U-94 and ordered "away boarding party. " 
Sub-Lieutenant H.E.T. Lawrence, RCNVR, and 
Stoker Petty Officer Arthur Powell, RCNR, leapt 
from the corvette to the forward deck of the 
submarine.40 They scrambled to the conning 
tower, which they found "riddled with bullet 
holes," but were too late to save the submarine. 
After looking below, Lawrence ordered everyone 
overboard. A few minutes later, U-94 sank by 
the stern.41 Sea boats from Oakville and USS 
Lea recovered the two boarders and rescued 26 
Germans. The corvette's asdic dome and 
oscillator had been crushed, and water flooded 
the asdic compartment and after boiler room. 
Despite these in jur ies , Oakville made 
Guantanamo under its own power.42 
Once again, asdic and radar played only a 
secondary role in the destruction of the U-boat. 
The Catalina made initial contact by eyesight in 
the moonlight. Oakville's SW2C radar did not 
pick up U-94 one mile away in a moderate sea 
and swell. Its basic type 123A asdic did make 
contact in good asdic conditions but was not 
called upon to hold it for very long. Like U-210, 
the surface battle that followed was old-
fashioned, calling for a high degree of 
seamanship and gunnery, and ramming brought 
it to a successful conclusion. Oakville's crew was 
nothing if not well trained. King drilled his crew 
relentlessly at action stations, boarding party, 
man overboard, abandon ship, and other 
exercises. The Deck Log shows that boarding 
party drills had been practised as recently as 31 
July and 19-20 August 1942.43 His First 
Lieutenant, Kenneth B. Culley, RCNVR, later 
remembered that "it was a bit much" at times 
but admitted that King's commitment to training 
paid off.44 
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The Sinking of U-756 
The last of the RCN's string of summer successes occurred on 1 September with the 
slow eastbound convoy SC 97. The certain 
destruction of U-756 was not apparent at the 
time, and it was not until over 40 years later 
that HMCS Morden received credit for the kill. 
The mid-ocean escort was C2, the same group 
that had escorted ON 113, now without St. Croix 
but with Morden and HMS Broadway for a 
strength of two destroyers and five corvettes. Two 
US Coast Guard Cutters joined mid-passage 
from Iceland. Group Vorwärts, a wolf pack of 
nine U-boats, intercepted SC 97 during the 
morning of 31 August and torpedoed two 
merchant ships. Two submarines maintained 
contact after sunset. Kapitänleutnant Horst 
Höltring, captain of U-604, trailed the last ship 
in the middle column while reloading after a 
failed attack. In addition, U-756 shadowed the 
starboard side of SC 97. Kapitänleutnant Klaus 
Harney radioed U-Boat Command at 2215Z that 
the convoy consisted of about twenty merchant 
sh ips and eight escorts , and s teamed a 
northeasterly course at 7 knots. U-756 was never 
heard from again.45 
The attack by HMCS Morden (below), captained by Lieutenant J.J. Hodgkinson 
(right), on Ü-756 was originally assessed with "insufficient evidence of damage." 
Today, there is little doubt tha t Morden destroyed U-756. 
Dark, unbroken clouds covered the sky 
except for a small patch of bright, starry sky on 
the northern horizon. Towards midnight the 
moon rose on the clear horizon, increasing 
visibility to 10 miles and silhouetting the 
merchant ships to the darker, starboard side.46 
The wind was force 3 from the north and the 
sea was moderate with a long, low swell. HMCS 
Morden "was on the port leg of a zig-zag two miles 
astern of SC 97" at 0050Z when its SW2C radar 
picked up a contact 1,500 yards on the starboard 
quarter. Lieutenant John J. Hodgkinson, RCNR, 
captain of Morden, altered course to investigate.47 
Hodgkinson was an experienced merchant 
seaman, described as a "Hard-Bitten" type who 
was "very popular" with his crew. Under his 
command, the corvette had received intensive 
anti-submarine training at HMS Western Isles 
in Tobermory, Scotland in February 1942. HMCS 
Morden received passing grades and Commodore 
G.O. Stephenson, RN, remarked that she "has 
the makings of a first-class ship. She is lucky in 
having a Commanding Officer and First 
Lieutenant who realize 
that they have got to 
keep on with the 
working-up."48 
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Hodgkinson sighted U-756 on the surface at 
close range, "steaming in the direction of the 
Convoy." He increased speed, as the Oerlikon 
opened up, and manoeuvred to ram, but Harney 
foiled the attempt by crash diving at 0115Z. 
Morden dropped two depth charges set to 50 
feet by eye on the swirl. Hodgkinson thought it 
was "difficult to imagine that the U-boat could 
have avoided being hit by the depth charges." 
The corvette made asdic contact afterwards and 
at 0128Z ran in for a second attack. Morden 
lost the contact at 300 yards and fired a pattern 
of five depth charges set to 150 feet. Hodgkinson 
opened out the range and re-established contact 
with U-756. The contact was lost at 300 yards 
again and Morden fired a pattern of ten depth 
charges set to 150 and 300 feet. In the darkness 
the crew sighted no debris, oil, or other evidence 
of damage on the surface to mark the destruction 
of U-756.49 
Below the surface, the other sub, U-604, had 
gone deep to 150 metres where Höltring had 
heard asdic sounds and released a Bold 
submarine decoy. He heard the last depth charge 
attack, further off and of no concern.50 During a 
brief search the corvette failed to regain contact. 
In the meantime, Commander Thomas Taylor, 
RN, the Senior Officer in HMS Burnham, had 
ordered Operation Raspberry "in case other 
U-boats were present" and instructed Morden 
to return immediately in view of the submarine 
activity.51 
Although the Admiralty initially assessed 
Morden's attack as "insufficient evidence of 
damage," today there is little doubt that it had 
destroyed U-756. Harney's boat made no further 
signals and the logs of the other submarines 
present reveal that none of them had been the 
U-boat sighted and attacked by Morden. The 
targets of all of the other counterattacks by the 
surface and air escorts of SC 97 have been 
identified. Thus, Morden's attack must have 
accounted for U-756.52 It was the first time that 
a detection made by SW2C radar had led to a 
kill. The evidence suggests that the corvette's type 
123A asdic was capably handled and the training 
received at Western Isles was put to good effect 
in the heat of the battle. 
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Conclusion 
The RCN's summer successes show the complex interplay of equipment, tactics, and 
training required to sink a U-boat at this stage 
of the Battle of the Atlantic. At first glance there 
are no patterns apparent in the five kills: each 
kill was made under a unique combination of 
circumstances. They were made both at night 
and by day, by both destroyers and corvettes, 
and by both professional and reserve escort 
c ap t a in s . The vict ims inc luded bo th 
inexperienced and veteran U-boat commanders. 
The means of detection included visual, asdic, 
and radar while the means of destruction 
included ramming, gunnery, and depth charges. 
The role played by the anti-submarine 
equipment that transformed ASW during the 
Second World War was not yet dominant during 
the summer of 1942. Radar made the initial 
detection in two of the five kills but really did 
little more than to tell the escort that a U-boat 
was out there. The primitive metric radars 
carried by Morden and Assiniboine- S W2C and 
type 286P - required calm seas to detect a U-boat 
and did not provide reliable information as to 
range and bearing. Centimetric radar, such as 
type 271 and subsequent models, with its 
superior discrimination of objects on the surface 
and accura te ranges and bear ings , and 
improvements such as Plan Position Indicators 
were still in the future for the RCN. Asdic played 
a greater role than radar, playing a part in all of 
the kills. Here, the RCN was again handicapped 
by obsolescent models. The corvettes in 
particular had to rely upon the pre-war type 
123A paired with a single primitive magnetic 
compass. The skill of the asdic teams of 
Wetaskiwin and Morden overcame these 
difficulties thanks to the intensive training they 
had received at St. John's and Western Isles. 
HMC Ships Skeena and St. Croix, which had 
the benefit of accurate gyro-compasses to direct 
their asdic hunts, also performed impressively 
in gaining and holding asdic contact and in 
depth-charge drill. None of these warships had 
yet been fitted with High Frequency/Direction 
Finding. 
To some degree the summer of 1942 
represents a transitional period in the evolution 
of anti-submarine warfare. Eyesight was still 
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss2/2
more important than radar detection and escort 
captains still resorted to ramming to dispatch 
two of the five U-boats. Indeed, these two actions 
deteriorated into surface gunnery duels between 
warship and submarine where high-speed ship-
handling was crucial to success. In that way, and 
with ramming and boarding attempts, they 
resembled traditional naval actions of the past. 
In contrast, by late 1943 radar and HF/DF would 
pinpoint the locations of U-boats prior to or in 
place of visual detection. Counter-attacks would 
be directed by more advanced asdic types and 
carried out with depth charges and, increasingly, 
ahead-thrown weapons. Ramming, with its 
resultant damage to the attacker, would be 
frowned upon. Barrages were more likely to be 
delivered by the closely coordinated teams of 
escorts foreshadowed by the success of Skeena 
and Wetaskiwin.53 This higher degree of 
sophistication in the art of anti-submarine 
warfare was still on the horizon in the summer 
of 1942 when sensors were primitive and 
ramming was considered an effective means of 
sinking a U-boat. 
If there was one common thread in the RCN's 
successes, it was the ability of the commanding 
officers to overcome the deficiencies in 
equipment through a combination of tactics, 
training, and experience. The evidence, where 
available, suggests that each of the commanding 
officers, whether reserve or professional, 
involved in these kills was a capable escort 
captain who was firmly committed to training 
his crew to a high level of efficiency. King, credited 
with four U-boats kills by the end of the war, is 
the most outstanding example of these qualities. 
Dobson and Windeyer both destroyed two enemy 
U-boats while Stubbs had an impressive fighting 
record in destroyers. Dyer was an innovative 
tactical theorist whose ideas were carefully 
studied and adopted by the ASW analysts in the 
Royal Navy; he later rose to the rank of Vice-
Admiral in the postwar RCN. Though less is 
known about Hodgkinson, he received excellent 
grades from the Royal Navy taskmasters at 
Western Isles. Of course, by its very nature, this 
is a study of the elite escorts of the RCN. Only 
those warships which sank enemy submarines 
are considered so it is not reflective of the 
Canadian Navy as a whole. It is also important 
to remember that this is a study of U-boat 
hunting not convoy defence, the escort's primary 
task at this stage of the war at sea. Still, it was 
too often the bottom strata of RCN escorts which, 
in the eyes of Canada's allies, created an 
unfavourable impression of the service out of all 
proportion to their actual numbers. 
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